Iran’s proxy force Houthis join the war, threaten to disrupt Bab al-Mandeb strait: Read what it means for global trade with Strait of Hormuz already choked

A 30 kilometer wide stretch of water silently bears the weight of the entire globe somewhere between the volcanic coastline of Djibouti and the scorching deserts of Yemen. It is called Bab el-Mandeb, Arabic for the Gate of Grief or Gate of Tears. Ancient Arab legend holds that it was named after the thousands drowned when an earthquake split the Horn of Africa from the Arabian Peninsula. The grief of today is different, it is strategic, economic, and intensely political. If things go wrong, there will be tears shed in both European capitals and Asian boardrooms. The maritime route that links Europe and Asia without going around the whole African continent is this narrow strait, which is situated at the southernmost point of the Red Sea. Between 10 and 12 percent of all global maritime trade passes through it every single year. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, 9.3 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products passed through this route daily in 2023, accounting for about 12% of all seaborne oil traded globally. It’s more than just a waterway. It is an essential component of the global economy, and it is currently under serious threat. Two straits, two worlds: Hormuz vs. Bab el-Mandeb To comprehend Bab el-Mandeb, one must first separate it from the Strait of Hormuz, the two are frequently spoken together, but they are fundamentally distinct in character and consequence. Image cia CNN The most important oil choke point in the world is the Strait of Hormuz, which is located between Iran and Oman. Every day, more than 20 million barrels of oil, roughly one-fifth of the world’s petroleum consumption, pass through it. Tehran has unparalleled geographic clout because Iran directly borders it. Brent crude prices rise within hours of Iran threatening to close Hormuz, sending shock waves through the markets. Persian Gulf oil has virtually no escape route other than through this small opening, making it a dead end. Partial relief is provided by Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, which transports up to 5 million barrels of oil per day overland to Red Sea ports. However, in order for that oil to reach its markets, it must first pass through Bab el-Mandeb. Bab el-Mandeb is unique. Ships can theoretically enter and exit from a variety of directions, hence it is not a dead end. But what makes it just as hazardous are the banks. A bankrupt state on one side and the world’s most contentious military real estate on the other. Iran does not physically border Bab el-Mandeb, in contrast to Hormuz. Rather, Tehran uses the Houthis of Yemen, a much more sneaky tool, to control it. Finally, there is no land bypass for container ships. There are some pipeline options for Hormuz. Bab el-Mandeb doesn’t have any. Iran’s long shadow: The Houthis and the proxy war In the 1990s, the Houthis, formerly known as Ansar Allah, started out as a political and religious movement in north-west Yemen. By 2014, they had taken control of Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, starting a civil war that attracted Iran and a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia. Since then, Tehran has given the Houthis intelligence, ballistic missiles, drones, and ideological support, turning what was initially a local insurgency into a fully armed paramilitary organisation that can attack targets hundreds of kilometres away.    Their link to Iran is more than just practical; it is a key component of Tehran’s ‘Axis of Resistance,’ a network of proxy groups that includes Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and militias in Iraq. Bab el-Mandeb is the preferred weapon of the Houthis, who act as Iran’s long arm in the Arabian Sea. The Houthis have attacked commercial shipping in the Red Sea more than 190 times since the start of the Israel-Gaza war in late 2023. They have used drones, ballistic missiles, and anti-ship missiles to target ships thought to be connected to Israel, the US, or the UK. The repercussions were severe and quick. Between December 2023 and early 2024, container shipping across the Red Sea decreased by 90%. Large shipping companies like Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, and MSC diverted their ships around the Cape of Good Hope, resulting in an additional 14 days and more than $1 million in fuel expenses per trip. Between October 2023 and May 2024 alone, items valued at than $1 trillion were disrupted, according to the Russell Group. Every disturbance in this strait adds an invisible tax to global inflation, one that the general public must pay in the form of higher prices for fuel, gadgets, and groceries. Europe bleeds first When Bab el-Mandeb is destabilised, Europe bears the brunt of the pain. Most traffic between Asian and European ports is handled by the Suez Canal route, which Bab el-Mandeb directly feeds. According to France 24, this corridor serves as the main conduit for everything from industrial machinery to consumer electronics between the two continents. European importers bear the consequences of ships diverting to the Cape route, including delayed delivery, higher insurance premiums, and increased prices for commodities. The energy vulnerability of Europe is far more severe. The continent imports large amounts of LNG from Qatar, which must travel via Hormuz and Bab-al-Mandeb both before arriving at installations in Europe. As winter drew near, Qatar halted LNG tanker operations in the Red Sea following the Houthi strikes, raising concerns throughout Europe. Following the Ukraine crisis, European nations sought to replace Russian pipeline gas with LNG, making this sea route not just commercially significant but also existential. Agricultural goods such as wheat, fertilisers, and edible oils also move through this corridor, linking food security to the security of this 30-kilometre stretch. Acknowledging this risk, the European Union initiated countermeasures. Operation Aspides, a naval convoy and escort mission mandated through at least February 2026, began in early 2024. In the meantime, Egypt’s Suez Canal, which depends solely on traffic passing through Bab el-Mandeb, saw its quarterly revenues plummet from $2.4 billion to just $880 million. This is a devastating blow to an already struggling economy and a sobering example of how economic shockwaves in this region do not remain contained. Djibouti: One of the busiest shorline squeeze Djibouti, a country the size of Mizoram with a population of just one million, is located on the African side of the strait and is possibly the most militarily significant territory on the planet. The United States supports drone operations and counterterrorism missions throughout East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula from Camp Lemonnier, its sole permanent military post in Africa, located in Djibouti. The previous colonial power, France, also keeps a permanent military there. On this little piece of land, military stations are also run by Saudi Arabia, Japan, Italy, Germany, and a number of other countries. Then there’s China. The People’s Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti became Beijing’s first military base abroad in 2017. Constructed at an estimated $590 million, it is officially referred to as a ‘logistics facility,’ yet it can accommodate huge Navy warships and is continuously growing in size. Approximately 25% of China’s imports and exports go via the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, demonstrating the country’s clear business interests. However, the base also serves as a strategic declaration, giving Beijing direct access to one of the most important waterways in the world and making it abundantly evident to Washington that Chinese military might has transcended the Indo-Pacific.  China’s growing influence in Djibouti provides a complicated new variable for both Europe and America, the European Council on Foreign Relations warns, especially as Beijing has shown a desire to keep profitable ties with both sides of the conflict, including Iran. One of the most remarkable geopolitical spectacles of our time is the existence of American, French, Chinese, Japanese, and Italian military stations within kilometers of one another on this little country. If the gate closes: Scenarios and consequences Technically speaking, it is unlikely that Bab el-Mandeb will be completely closed physically because the strait is too broad to be blocked. However, a physical barrier is not necessary for closure in contemporary conflict. The similar outcome can be obtained in insurance markets. At least 88 distinct Houthi attacks on commercial vessels from November 2023 were documented by the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), impacting businesses from more than 55 nations. Even in the absence of an actual attack, the threat was sufficient to make many voyages commercially unfeasible due to the sharp increase in war risk insurance costs. Over 30% of the world’s seaborne oil would be blocked if both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb were disrupted simultaneously, a possibility that analysts are actively cautioning about, according to Al Jazeera . The price of oil would rise to levels not seen since the energy crisis of the 1970s. Already struggling with the lingering impacts of post-pandemic inflation, central banks would have to choose between raising rates and stifling growth or holding them and letting prices rise again. Pharmaceutical, industrial, and electronics supply chains would collapse. Importantly, transit through Bab el-Mandeb reached a record low in June 2025, down 65% from June 2023, despite a drop in active Houthi strikes in 2025, according to ACLED’s regional study. The harm to market confidence will outlast the missiles. Where does this go? Bab el-Mandeb’s strategic calculation is changing in real time. Every asymmetric actor on the planet is analysing the Houthis’ demonstration to the world that a non-state actor equipped with reasonably priced drones and missiles can hold the international economy hostage. According to NBC News, an unidentified Iranian military officer has specifically identified Bab el-Mandeb as a possible theatre of reprisal in the event that Iran’s territory or islands are attacked. This indicates that Tehran considers this strait to be an operational deterrent rather than merely a theoretical leverage point. Regardless of whether attacks continue, freight rates and insurance premiums should stay high in the near future. Global shipping markets now permanently incorporate the psychological risk premium associated with this route. Although no pipeline on Earth can replace the container shipping that passes through Bab el-Mandeb, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will face growing pressure in the medium term to construct pipeline infrastructure that avoids both straits. Meanwhile, Europe will strengthen its naval commitments in the Red Sea while concurrently accelerating energy diversification at home with more LNG gasification terminals, more capacity for renewable energy sources, and more pipeline agreements with North Africa. China, as usual, will play all sides, increasing its military and economic presence in Djibouti while keeping profitable trading connections with Iran and quietly placing diplomatic pressure on the Houthis when its own economic interests are endangered. The long game, however, goes to whoever can stabilise Yemen. The Washington Institute warns that the future security of these maritime lanes will be heavily influenced by Iran-US tensions and the international community’s readiness to firmly implement arms embargoes against the Houthis. Without a long-term political settlement in Sanaa that cuts off the Houthis’ supply stream from Tehran, no naval convoy, insurance policy, or pipeline reroute can provide a permanent solution. The Gate of Tears will continue to be just that. Conclusion The Bab el-Mandeb Strait has borne nations’ pain for a long time. Today, it carries the weight of global trade, energy security, and great power competition in a corridor hardly broader than a city’s morning commute. For decades, the world took it for granted, a path that merely functions, subtly and silently, day in and day out. The Houthis, with Iranian assistance and asymmetric creativity, have utterly shattered that assumption. What happens in Yemen does not remain in Yemen. It affects European grocery expenses, Asian manufacturing schedules, American fuel prices, and regular people’s savings accounts on every continent. The Gate of Tears is once again living up to its name, and the world should finally take it seriously.