Pentagon’s report on China’s military developments: What it means for India’s LAC stand, Pakistan front and the future of warfare. Read details

The recently published ‘Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2025)’ by the U.S. Department of Defence, which was required by Congress, provides an organised overview of how Washington evaluates China’s strategy, force modernisation, and operational preparedness, particularly for high-level conflict in the Indo-Pacific. The report’s framing is crucial; it contends that the PLA is preparing for a strong enemy (the United States) and is constructing a whole-of-nation strategy Beijing refers to as ‘national total war,’ with the First Island Chain serving as the immediate strategic centre of gravity while simultaneously pursuing global power projection.

Some documents define a nation, while others describe a trajectory. The Pentagon’s most recent congressionally mandated assessment of China’s military and security advancements is the latter. The basic assertion of the paper is straightforward: China is developing the PLA into a tool of national power intended not only for Taiwanese emergencies but also for a broader, long-term capacity to compel, discourage, and, if necessary, engage in combat across a variety of spheres.

From an Indian standpoint, this report is valuable not because it discovers China’s ambitions, we have witnessed them at sea and at the LAC, but rather because it unifies the following (1) China’s push for regional military dominance (2) its growing network of overseas access points and logistics (3) its accelerating nuclear and missile posture (4) its maturation of cyber and information warfare and (5) a persistent Pakistan lever that Beijing can use to complicate India’s deterrence calculations.

Beijing’s on a deadline

The Pentagon reiterates that Xi Jinping has instructed the PLA to be able to accomplish important goals by 2027 often associated in U.S. assessments with a Taiwan contingency and presents this as a component of Beijing’s larger strategy to alter the regional balance. The report also emphasizes that U.S. and ally operations in the Western Pacific are seriously threatened by China’s expanding missile weapons, which are capable of holding targets at long ranges. 

The immediate conclusion for India is not that Taiwan equals a distant problem. It is that even though the centre of gravity is still in the East, the same set of capabilities, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance), precision strike, integrated air defence, long range fires, cyber, space support, and logistics can be used in a variety of theatres, including the Indian Ocean and the Himalayas. In other terms, China is assembling a toolbox. India sits awkwardly near a number of the nails.

The LAC and Arunachal Pradesh: Stabilise the border, cap India’s partnerships

One of the most India-relevant parts in the report is about diplomacy on the Line of Actual Control, not missiles or ships. The Pentagon points out that just prior to a meeting between Xi and Modi at the BRICS summit in October 2024, India and China announced an agreement to disengage from remaining standoff sites along the LAC. Monthly high-level discussions on border management and limited normalisation initiatives followed. The report’s assessment is instructive that India is still sceptical and mutual mistrust continues to limit the connection, while China probably wants to take advantage of lower tensions to stabilise bilateral relations and stop USA-India ties from growing. 

This is a classic Beijing strategy, drop the temperature just enough to lessen external balancing against China while maintaining the underlying pressure points that generated the crisis in the first place. The conclusion for India is that while calm along the LAC might be strategically beneficial, it can also be perilous if it leads to complacency in infrastructure, force posture, surveillance, or alliance/partnership momentum.

A relevant mental model is that China does not require the LAC to remain heated in order for it to function as leverage. When China constructs roads, communities, logistical hubs, ISR, and airfields along a peaceful border, it may still deploy new normal disinformation to portray Indian countermoves as escalating.

The logic of the Pentagon report makes Arunachal Pradesh, the silent pivot of this whole competition, much more crucial. China’s persistent attempts to challenge India’s sovereignty in this area (by renaming locations, sending signals akin to stapled visas in the past, and promoting maximalist historical narratives) are more than just ‘propaganda,’ they are preparations for coercion. Gaining influence in Arunachal doesn’t require the PLA to start a war. In order to raise the political cost of India’s regular governance (infrastructure, tourism, elections, investment), it can employ calibrated pressure, such as patrol intrusions, infrastructure buildup across the border, abrupt exercises, airspace assertions, and information campaigns. 

According to the Pentagon report, China aims for ‘strategic deterrence and control’ over neighboring countries while maintaining pressure below open conflict. This makes Arunachal an ideal arena because it has high symbolic value for Beijing, high emotional and territorial stakes for India, and a location where China’s enhanced ISR, logistics, and rapid-mobilization capabilities can be used to signal escalation dominance without necessarily crossing thresholds. 

Treating Arunachal as a core state rather than a ‘frontier’ would be the proper course of action for India. This would entail strengthening persistent surveillance and counter-drone layers, accelerating road, bridge, and airfield resilience, and promoting a diplomacy plus development narrative that prevents Beijing from depicting the state as “disputed” in international discourse. 

The Pakistan angle: China’s second front

Pakistan is the other pressure axis if the LAC is one, and the study offers a relevant actual data point, China’s J-10C (fourth-generation aircraft) shipments. According to the report, as of May 2025, China has supplied Pakistan with 20 J-10C units, which are said to be its only J-10C exports. These units were connected to two earlier orders totalling 36 since 2020. That transfer isn’t symbolic. When combined with contemporary air-to-air missiles, sensors, and data linking, it represents an operational enhancement of Pakistan’s capacity to challenge airspace and endanger valuable assets. 

Pakistan’s advantage was linked to situational awareness and an integrated sensor to shooter chain using Chinese origin systems, with J-10C fighters and long-range missiles playing a crucial role, according to Reuters reporting surrounding the May 2025 India-Pakistan air battle. The strategic significance for India is evident even in cases where Pakistan’s claims were made up and greatly exaggerated: China’s military-industrial ecosystem can quickly improve Pakistan’s deterrence toolkit, and Pakistan can act as a technical, tactical, and narrative testing ground for Chinese systems.

The narrative component is no longer an afterthought. According to a Reuters article on the findings of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China launched a campaign to disparage the French Rafale following the India-Pakistan conflict, enhancing imagery and language aimed at marketing Chinese weaponry while undermining the reputations of Western platforms. India should interpret this as part of a larger trend, information operations as a combination of alliance disruption, export promotion, and deterrent shaping.

Connect this to the Pentagon report’s findings regarding China’s cyber posture, which include ongoing intrusion activities, pre-positioning in vital infrastructure, and a readiness to utilize cyber impacts to interfere with crisis logistics and decision-making. The ‘Pakistan angle’ for India encompasses more than just jets and weapons. Additionally, there is a chance of coordinated pressure, such as maritime signaling in the Indian Ocean, cyber and information pressure throughout the country, and kinetic threats along one axis, all of which are intended to divert India’s focus and complicate mobilization choices. 

The ‘STRING’ is less about bases, more about usable logistics

China’s foreign policy is still frequently described in Indian commentary as a spectacular ‘string of pearls’ map. The report offers a more pragmatic perspective, focusing on what China can truly accomplish with international access now and what it is developing to do in the future.

The Pentagon adds that the PLA Support Base in Djibouti has not helped noncombatant evacuations or the ongoing Red Sea crisis; instead, it has facilitated a permanent regional presence under counter-piracy framing and is increasingly supporting military diplomacy. That statement is significant because it suggests Beijing is still learning how to convert base ownership into full-spectrum operational utility, including collaborative planning, allied interoperability, logistics, repair, medical, and crisis response. To put it in Indian terms, China’s foreign policy is genuine but not yet smooth. 

Regarding Cambodia, the report mentions the opening of the Joint Logistics and Training Center at Ream Naval Base in April 2025. While both sides will retain vital personnel for operations, official claims regarding training and humanitarian missions and denials regarding permanent basing are noted. Texture has been added by independent reporting and analysis: While highlighting ongoing international concerns and the symbolism of increased facilities, the AP reported on Cambodia’s public claim that Ream is not exclusive. The Diplomat looked at the improved infrastructure as well as the unanswered questions regarding the scope of China’s privileged access, including suggestions that some facilities might be functionally exclusive. 

Ream doesn’t scare India because it is ‘encircled’ by a single port on the Gulf of Thailand. It is significant because it is an additional phase in a larger Chinese initiative to establish several nodes that shorten PLA operational distances, extend time on station, and normalize presence in areas linked to India’s maritime alliances and commerce lines. 

And this is where the Pentagon study becomes awkwardly direct: it mentions a number of nations, including Pakistan, in which China is evaluating military access for potential future development (along with locations like Burma, Thailand, Sri Lanka, UAE, and others). India’s western seaboard and Arabian Sea calculations would be altered if China were to obtain even restricted, rotating, logistics only access in Pakistan that could be used in times of crisis, especially when combined with Pakistan’s own naval modernization and China’s submarine expertise. 

China’s capability that affect India: missiles, nuclear posture, cyber and maritime power

Nuclear and Missile trajectory: According to the report, China’s stockpile of nuclear warheads was in the ‘low 600s’ until 2024, but it is still expected to surpass 1,000 by 2030. Additionally, it details an open ocean launch of an unarmed DF-31B ICBM in September 2024 and implies that China is creating early warning and counterstrike strategies similar to launch on warning logic. The estimate that China most certainly loaded more than 100 DF-31 class ICBMs into silo fields, a sign of accelerated nuclear modernization was noted in Reuters’ coverage of the study.

This should not be interpreted by India as China is suddenly targeting India, but rather as (1) China’s strategic forces are growing in ways that boost confidence and escalation options and (2) increased Chinese nuclear capacity can alter the diplomatic and psychological context in which Beijing supports Pakistan in times of crisis. Because it feels that deterrence is greater, a more secure China at the top of the escalation ladder may be more inclined to take chances further down.

Cyber and Information Warfare: The paper highlights rising infiltration activity, characterizes China as the most persistent cyber danger to U.S. networks, and discusses the PLA’s efforts to maintain strong cyber capabilities meant to weaken vital systems during a crisis or conflict. It also highlights a significant vulnerability, China’s lack of combat experience and integration into joint military operations may make it difficult to use cyber capabilities. 

This is both a warning and an opportunity for India, while the size of the investment indicates growing complexity, complicated joint integration is still difficult even for strong military, and India can take advantage of doctrinal and interoperability gaps.

Maritime power and the Indian ocean: The report highlights China’s growing international involvement in energy security, its desire for operational reach, and its access to important maritime routes. 

This is consistent with more general evaluations that indicate India is currently attempting to transition from a historically land-heavy strategic stance to a more powerful naval counterpart, despite obstacles related to procurement and tempo. It is not implied that India has to match ship for ship. By enhancing marine domain awareness, undersea deterrence, and partner enabled presence, India can make sure the Indian Ocean continues to be an undesirable arena for PLA coercion.

China’s weakness: where India should be realistic

China has weaknesses, despite all its posturing and expansionist plans. There are limitations in its planning. However, rather than waiting for limits to last, India’s benefit lies in taking advantage of them more quickly than China can adjust. 

Corruption and Political control: Even if long-term discipline improves, the Pentagon report highlights the short-term preparedness impacts of Xi’s anti-corruption effort against Rocket Force leadership and defence industry elders. The important realisation for India is that the PLA’s modernisation is profoundly political rather than just technological. Political purges have the potential to skew procurement decisions, impede decision-making, and promote risk aversion. However, they can also create a more strictly regulated PLA that uses fewer internal veto points to carry out Xi’s aims. 

Industrial choke points: According to the report, China’s reliance on foreign suppliers for some aircraft and helicopter engines is diminishing. This is important because advertised platform numbers frequently conceal hidden restrictions related to propulsion and materials science. India should keep an eye on China’s capacity to maintain high-performance engine dependability, maintenance cycles, and sortie rates at scale in addition to how many airframes? 

Overseas basing still maturing into operational muscle: The research describes Djibouti’s limited utilization in big crises, which implies a learning curve in expeditionary logistics and crisis response credibility. Since the simplest moment to create a theater is before the other side’s presence becomes routine, India can take advantage of this window by strengthening its own partner logistics arrangements, repair hubs, and maritime cooperation. 

The intangible business, real combat integration: The report’s observation that little combat experience makes it difficult to integrate cyber into joint warfare serves as a reminder that joint warfighting is a lived, trained, and tested culture rather than a PowerPoint skill. However, India needs to exercise caution because China may make up for its lack of combat experience with scale, sensors, and precision weapons. China also learns quickly through exercises, simulations, and watching other people’s fights. 

Beijing’s preferred strategy is pressure without triggering a coalition slam

A consistent Chinese preference becomes apparent when you combine the report’s LAC reading, its description of global access building, and its Pakistan arms-export data point.

In order to ensure that India invests on near border and Pakistan contingencies, hesitates on deep marine projection, and advances gingerly in coalitions, China’s best option is to keep India strategically limited but not publicly mobilized. This explains why periods of border thawing can coincide with increased Chinese outreach in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, and why Beijing finds arms shipments to Pakistan to be strategically advantageous because they are comparatively inexpensive as compared to the ongoing expense India must bear in retaliation. 

Add the information layer now, the claim made by Reuters that China escalated messaging to disparage Rafale during the India-Pakistan conflict suggests a desire to influence third-country procurement decisions and impact global perceptions. This is significant because the purchase of Chinese sensors, missiles, and planes by Southeast Asian nations, Gulf allies, and African littorals affects India’s security environment and creates interoperability ecosystems that facilitate PLA access and hinder India’s influence. 

Predictions: what the next decade could look like for India

1) Managed calm at the LAC will come and go, but infrastructure will keep moving forward

According to the research, China believes that managing India’s external alignments will result in less LAC conflict. 

Anticipate cycles of increased pressure when Beijing wants leverage (or when it thinks India is preoccupied), engagement and partial normalisation when Beijing seeks strategic leeway. India should view a tranquil border as an opportunity to strengthen preparedness rather than a cause for relaxation.

2) China-Pakistan military integration will deepen into a full spectrum ecosystem including air, cyber, space aided ISR, and narrative shaping

The J-10C delivery statistic is just one indication of the larger trend in which China is transforming Pakistan into an interoperable ally whose capabilities may make India’s air and missile defense calculations more difficult. 

Anticipate increased focus on drones, coordinated messaging, long-range air-to-air missiles, EW, integrated air defense, and data linkages.

3) The Indian Ocean contest will increasingly be about logistics, undersea, and gray zone presence, not dramatic fleet battles

For China’s expeditionary logistics, Ream and Djibouti are more important as learning laboratories than as bases.

Prioritizing marine domain awareness, ASW, island infrastructure, and partner interoperability areas where India can create high friction for PLA operations without attempting to replicate China’s industrial scale will be the most effective way for India to respond. 

4) Chinese nuclear expansion will reshape crisis psychology in Asia

The difficulty of escalation management is increased by China’s plan to have more than 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, silo loading, and early warning/counterstrike concepts.

Maintaining credible deterrence, bolstering decision-time resilience (communications, cyber hardening, continuity of government), and creating diplomatic crisis-management channels that lessen miscalculation during high-tempo events are crucial for India.

What India should do strategically, not rhetorically 

A phrase like ‘two-front threat’ is not the most crucial Indian answer. Geographical advantage is created by a set of priorities.

India should prioritize (1) faster surveillance to decision loops (space, drones, aerostats, SIGINT, and fusion), (2) hardened air and missile defense with cyber resilience, (3) long range precision and counter ISR options that increase China’s risk at the LAC, (4) maritime domain awareness and undersea deterrence in the Indian Ocean, and (5) a serious information strategy that anticipates disinformation aimed at procurement, alliances, and domestic cohesion. Future conflicts will be fought twice, once in the sky and once on the ground, according to Reuters reporting on the Rafale-related narrative drama.

Additionally, India must create plug and play logistical and intelligence collaboration where interests align, avoiding inflexible bloc behavior that Beijing might diplomatically exploit, and embrace partnerships without sacrificing strategic autonomy. The Pentagon report’s own framing that China wants to stop U.S.-India ties from getting stronger should be interpreted as evidence that India’s alliances are important and seen as detrimental to China’s chosen course of action.

Conclusion

When read objectively, the Pentagon’s China report is more than just about an American planning document and Taiwan. It is a mirror held up to the next stage of the Indo-Pacific. China is developing large-scale coercion tools, experimenting with international logistics, expanding nuclear options, and using Pakistan as an economic means of drawing India’s attention while simultaneously attempting to keep the LAC quiet enough to impede India’s external balancing. 

The implication is not one of panic for India. There is a clear sense of urgency. China is endlessly iterative, but it is not unbeatable. In order to increase China’s costs over the entire arc from the Himalayas to the sea lanes, India must be as iterative, quicker in procurement reform, sharper in collaboration, more robust in cyber and narratives, and more thoughtful in exploiting geography and partnerships.